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I. INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Board of Education,' the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place."2 While some perceive alternative education programs
("AEPs") as the last hope for "at risk" students, others contend that such
programs merely function as "dumping grounds" reserved for disruptive,
underprivileged, minority students. Reflecting on the Brown decision,
school officials should not only recognize the legal exposure arising from
poorly-administered exclusionary programs that have the effect of creating
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Gary R. Jones, United States District Court, Middle
District of Florida; Adjunct Professor of Education Law, Barry University; J.D., 2003, Uni-
versity of Miami School of Law; Ph.D., 2002, Barry University; M.S. Edu., 1997, Barry Uni-
versity; B.A., 1995, Barry University. I dedicate this article to Amy D. Ronner, Professor of
Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, who has helped me and countless others form,
reach, and exceed their goals in scholarship and professional practice. I am also grateful to
my wife, Sherri D'Agata, who, as always, is my source of inspiration.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 495.
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an underclass, but such officials should also evaluate their compliance with
the moral imperative that the Brown Court articulated some fifty years ago.
Part II of this article examines the various forces driving the develop-
ment and implementation of AEPs in our public school districts. Part III
then describes the form and function of the typical AEP. This part discusses
common transfer schemes and also provides a snapshot of AEP student en-
rollment around the nation. Part IV considers various legal issues arising
from the implementation of AEPs in our school districts. This part offers the
reader an array of case law dealing with one's rights to an education, and
also outlines prospective legal challenges that may emerge with the growth
of AEPs. Finally, Part V examines the overall justification of AEPs against
the backdrop of the Brown decision. This section identifies components that
comprise an educational program that is both legally and educationally le-
gitimate under Brown, and also considers alternatives to AEPs that might
more closely approximate the vision of the Brown Court.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
The creation and development of AEPs across the country can be attrib-
uted to a number of external and internal motivating forces. Outside our
school systems, the media has aided the development of AEPs by depicting
our public schools as madhouses of chaos and violence. Political external
forces have also contributed to the development of AEPs by the advancement
of legislation and funding schemes which require schools to take stem disci-
plinary measures against students who are characterized as violent and dis-
ruptive. Inside our school systems, administrators, teachers, and parents
have also encouraged the development of AEPs. Although their motivations
may be as numerous as they are diverse, these groups purport that AEPs not
only better serve the needs of disruptive students, but they also advance the
interests of traditional school teachers who want to teach, and traditional
school children who want to learn.
A. External Forces
Scholars have long recognized that fear of school violence has played a
prominent role in the proliferation of AEPs across the country.3 It is gener-
3. See Jonathan Wren, "Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths"--A Cure for What
Ails School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 307, 309-10 (1995);
Augustina H. Reyes, Alternative Education: The Criminalization of Student Behavior, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 543 (2001); Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an
[Vol. 29:3:635
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/4
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
ally accepted that public schools are no longer considered places of safety
and stability.4 Doubtlessly, this bleak outlook has been shaped by the me-
dia's fixation on the apparently omnipresent specter of violence and chaos in
our schools.
The media portrays public school classrooms as noisy and chaotic
places in which students and teachers are subject to a culture of intense fear
and intimidation.5 According to some journalists, teachers are not even re-
motely interested in the welfare of their students, and chaos reigns supreme
in their classrooms. 6 The New York Times recently reported that Mayor Mi-
chael Bloomberg planned to dispatch a task force of 150 police officers to 12
of New York City's most violent high schools and middle schools to curb
violence.7 Joining suit, the Boston Herald also recently informed its readers
that the number of students implicated in school weapons or assault crimes
has soared exponentially in Massachusetts from 2000 through 2003.8 Be-
yond its exposure of the egregious levels of violence present in school halls
across America, the media has also suggested that school authorities rou-
tinely underreport violent incidents that occur on school grounds.9
Statistical findings lend support to the media's depiction of pervasive
violence in our schools. In recent years, the United States Department of
Justice reported that an estimated nine percent of students have experienced
one or more violent crimes while attending school.'0 More chillingly, the
National Education Association recently found that 100,000 students across
the country bring guns to school every day and another 2000 students are
attacked each hour of the school day."'
The general public has heard the media's repeated messages of school
violence loud and clear-and that message has also reached the ears of the
Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 61 (2002).
4. Wren, supra note 3, at 309-10.
5. Bob Herbert, Failing Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2003, at A23, 2003 WLNR
5654908.
6. See id.
7. Elissa Gootman, Police to Guard 12 City Schools Cited as Violent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2004, at A1, 2004 WLNR 5598486.
8. Kevin Rothstein, Ed Records: School Weapons, Assault Crimes On the Rise, BOSTON
HERALD, Aug. 9, 2003, at 10, 2003 WLNR 647920.
9. Sam Dillon, School Violence Data Under a Cloud in Houston, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2003, at Al, 2003 WLNR 5683140. The New York Times recently reported that the Houston
Independent School District reported 761 assaults in its annual disciplinary summaries sent to
Austin whereas its own police, who patrol the schools, reported 3,091 assaults during the same
time period. Id.
10. Wren, supra note 3, at 310.
11. Id.
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country's judiciary. Indeed, courts have explicitly acknowledged the depic-
tion of chaos in our schools. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
noted, "[t]oday it is generally recognized that students are being deprived of
their education by lack of discipline in the schools. Not only does disorder
interfere with learning school studies, it also defeats the charge to 'inculcate
the habits and manners of civility.""'
Political and economic forces have also aided the proliferation of AEPs
across the country. To combat school violence, politicians who have adopted
a "tough on crime" political posture have sought to bar violent students from
schools altogether." Perhaps the most well known legislation resulting from
that camp's activist position is the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.14 Under
the Act, the United States Department of Education may cease funding to
states that do not adopt a policy requiring one-year expulsions of students
caught with guns at schools. 5
Such politicians have found great appeal in AEPs, and for good reason.
"Tough on crime" political figures that wish to avoid attacks from critics of
zero tolerance exclusionary measures have found a comfortable middle
ground in supporting the advancement of AEPs. 6 Lending their support to
AEPs, these figures are seen as responding to those constituencies who are
calling for an end to school chaos while avoiding critics' claims that tradi-
tional exclusionary tactics are short-sighted and irresponsible. 7
There are also economic factors that compel the development of AEPs.
As explained more thoroughly below, most AEPs serve students who are
considered "at risk" of dropping out of school. Roughly one million students
drop out of school each year.'8 "Dropping out of high school . . . is associ-
ated with a greater need for such expensive social services as public assis-
tance and unemployment assistance."' 9 These societal costs grow exponen-
12. Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
13. Wren, supra note 3, at 312-13.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994) (repealed 2002, current version at 20 U.S.C.A § 7151 (West
Supp. 2003)); Wren, supra note 3, at 313.
15. Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended
and Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 582, 604-05 (1996); Rene Sanchez, Expulsions
Becoming Popular Weapon in U.S. Schools, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1995, at Al, 1995 WL
2074258; Kenneth J. Cooper, President Directs Schools to Bar Students with Guns; Law
Threatens Elimination of Federal Funds, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1994, at A8, 1994 WL
2447095.
16. Wren, supra note 3, at 347-48.
17. Id.
18. Reed, supra note 15, at 605.
19. id. at 606.
[Vol. 29:3:635
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/4
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
tially when taking into consideration the foregone income of dropouts. 2° One
study estimated that "the foregone income of dropouts from the class of 1981
amounted to $228 billion and that the foregone government revenues totalled
[sic] $68 billion.' Indeed, it has been estimated that "for every dollar spent
on 'early intervention and prevention ... $4.74 [can be saved] in costs of
remedial education, welfare, and crime."' 22
B. Internal Forces
AEPs have also been promoted by groups of teachers and school-site
administrators. Teachers have protested that they spend the majority of their
time on small groups of students who are "conduct-disordered. 23  Such
teachers apparently maintain that excluding disruptive students from the tra-
ditional classroom will allow them to adequately teach the remainder of stu-
dents in their classrooms who are willing to learn and cooperate.24 It has also
been reported that teachers who are outright "unable to deal with disruptive
students" have also encouraged the development of AEPs, because the pro-
grams themselves allow those teachers to avoid behaviorally troubled stu-
dents altogether.25
School administrators also find AEPs appealing, if not solely for rea-
sons related to school finance.26 Depending on the time of year that a student
is expelled, a school may sacrifice the financing that such a student would
generate if the school could report the student as enrolled. 7 If the school
district offered an AEP, the amount of funding an excluded student generated
at the transferor school may still be available to that school even after the
student is transferred to the AEP.28 Further, removing potentially low-
performing students from campus presents an opportunity for administrators
to boost their school's performance ratings, which, in turn, could lead to cash
rewards for administrators in certain school systems.2
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wren, supra note 3, at 346.
24. See id. at 346-47.
25. Id. at 346.
26. See id.
27. See Dillon, supra note 9.
28. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 548.
29. Id. at 546.
2005]
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C. The Debate.: Proponents and Opponents
Proponents of AEPs point to several additional reasons to advance such
programs. First, they maintain that AEPs increase a student's belief in his or
her academic ability while decreasing their disruptive behavior.30 Such ad-
vocates suggest that unruly students will perform better in alternative schools
because they offer individualized curricula and because the students are
given the opportunity to be among similarly-situated youth, encouraging
them "to reflect upon their lives and consider their actions, resulting in
heightened self-esteem and eventually better performance."'"
Some supporters suggest that AEPs present a "less harmful way" of re-
ducing the tension between the state's interest in maintaining discipline and
the student's interest in receiving an adequate public education.32 Further-
more, AEPs are seen as the most reasonable solution to disruptive behavior
because they "save" disruptive minority students from being condemned to a
life without education by total exclusion.33 These advocates tout alternative
education as a form of education intervention that "would break the cycle of
violence that drives these youth, before they commit criminal acts. 34 More-
over, this camp maintains that failing to offer such programs actually con-
tributes to problems of drug abuse, crime, and increased utilization of public
assistance.35
Critics view AEPs as "dumping grounds" reserved for problematic and
mostly minority students. 36 Many contend that "alternative schools are noth-
ing more than a convenient place to warehouse students the conventional
system is unprepared to handle."37 Instead of helping these troubled stu-
dents, the traditional schools simply abandon them by placing these students
in exclusionary programs that offer virtually no academic content.38
Opponents making such charges point to programs like those adminis-
tered under Texas law, where "disciplinary" AEPs are administered by
county juvenile board officials who lack the instructional expertise to run a
successful academic program.39 The critics' fears are well taken, considering
30. Reed, supra note 15, at 587.
31. Wren, supra note 3, at 347.
32. Id. at 341.
33. Reed, supra note 15, at 609.
34. Wren, supra note 3, at 347.
35. See Reed, supra note 15, at 609.
36. Wren, supra note 3, at 349.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Steve Bickerstaff et al., Preserving the Opportunity for Education: Texas' Alter-
native Education Programs for Disruptive Youth, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 18-19 (1997).
[Vol. 29:3:635
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that under Texas law, although the academic mission of "Juvenile Justice
Alternative Education Programs" is to enable students to perform at grade
level, the programs are not required to provide courses necessary to fulfill a
student's high school graduation requirements.4"
Beyond the central criticism that AEPs offer virtually no academic con-
tent, the programs have been attacked for their punitive methodologies. Ex-
perts in the field of alternative education have stated that alternative schools
"are like soft jails, and that is not the most productive way to deal with hu-
man beings. It's a way of draining off the problem from the system rather
than changing the ... system."" That camp contends that although AEPs
may have been originally created to meet the needs of students that were not
being met by traditional schools, the programs "have started to look less like
educational alternatives for students and more like discipline alternatives for
schools. A student now attends an alternative school because she is 'bad,'
not because the new school will provide her with an educational alterna-
tive. ' 2 Such schools tend to "look less like schools and more like juvenile
detention centers., 43 Opponents argue that prison-like schools "blur the line
between education and punishment for students"' to the extent that some
accuse our traditional schools of the "criminalization" of low student
achievement.45
Even worse, school officials have been accused of using the threat of
AEP placement to coerce students who perform inadequately or who engage
in inappropriate behavior to "straighten up."' 46 That threat can be particularly
ominous, considering the fact that students in some alternative schools are
subject to levels of violence which are dramatically higher than those found
in traditional schools. 47 For example, alternative schools in one of Florida's
largest school districts routinely report "ten times more violent offenses-
including assault, battery, robbery, and weapons possession-per person than
do their conventional counterparts.
48
Finally, critics of AEPs find that they present a new form of segrega-
tion, generally separating Latinos and African Americans from the rest of the
40. Id. at 18 & n.92.
41. Wren, supra note 3, at 349-50 (quoting Jessica Portner, A New Breed of School for
Troubled Youths, 13 EDUC. WEEK, June 8, 1994, at 30).
42. Jessica Falk, Overcoming a Lawyer's Dogma: Examining Due Process for the "Dis-
ruptive Student," 36 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 457, 469 (2003).
43. Id. at 470.
44. Id.
45. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 540, 555-56.
46. Falk, supra note 42, at 469-70.
47. Wren, supra note 3, at 351.
48. Id.
2005]
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student population.49 Indeed, some opponents maintain that alternative
schools are paramount to segregated schools.5" Disparate enrollment trends
among poor and minority groups in exclusionary programs throughout the
country help to substantiate these claims.51
While Blacks comprise 21.4% of the students enrolled in public schools
across America, they comprise 38% of those suspended on an annual basis.52
"Black high school students are suspended from school at a rate of three
times that of white students., 53 Courts that have observed this disparity have
called it a form of "institutional racism.,
54
Research on student discipline demonstrates that minority students re-
ceive a disproportionate measure of discipline for their misbehavior in
schools.5 "When minority and non-minority students engage in an identical
discipline infraction, minority students receive harsher punishments by
school officials [than do their white counterparts]."56 This might explain
why underprivileged black students are disproportionately represented in
AEPs across the country. In Texas, for example, data for one school district
recently revealed that while 28% of its student enrollment was black, 43% of
those diverted into AEPs were black.
57
Some studies suggest that the racially disparate enrollment trends can be
attributed to a lack of classroom management skills among inexperienced
teachers.58 For example, an analysis of case study data covering elementary
school disciplinary referrals in Texas revealed that over 80% of the referrals
came from inexperienced teachers who lacked the skills necessary to manage
diverse student bodies.59 One school in the case study showed that "75% of
the discipline referrals were for African American males on a campus with a
less than 20% African American male student population."6
There is some criticism that making AEPs available actually exacer-
bates the problems related to school violence and mismanaged classrooms.
Some suggest that exclusionary tactics present "band aid" solutions that fail
to treat the underlying problems that cause students to act out in the first
49. Reyes, supra note 3, at 539.
50. See Wren, supra note 3, at 353.
51. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 548.
52. Reed, supra note 15, at 608.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 608-09.
55. Reyes, supra note 3, at 548.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 549.
58. Id. at 547.
59. Id.
60. Reyes, supra note 3, at 547.
[Vol. 29:3:635
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place.6 Moreover, the National School Boards Association found that ex-
clusionary practices, in general, actually reward teachers for avoiding class-
room responsibilities. 62 Further, the Association warned "removing trouble-
makers ... often harden[s] delinquent behavior patterns, alienate[s] troubled
youths from the schools, and foster[s] distrust.
'63
III. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE TYPICAL ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION
PROGRAM
AEPs typically combine a personalized curriculum and smaller class
size with the stringent restrictions and social controls found in correctional
institutions. Many have no grades and no homework requirements.6' They
may offer attendance incentives and self-paced schedules.65 In addition,
AEPs frequently focus on conflict resolution and behavior modification
courses, and often offer outreach services for students' families.66 In most
school systems, the overt goal is to return the student to the traditional school
setting after being placed temporarily in an AEP.67
School district policies governing student placement in an AEP vary.
Some school districts will place a student in a disciplinary AEP for horse-
play, copying another student's work, inappropriate displays of affection, or
loitering in unauthorized areas.68 Others, however, resort to AEP placement
for students who commit more serious legal and school policy violations.
Although there is some variation across school districts with regard to
placement procedures, the policies and procedures adopted by public schools
throughout North Carolina are relatively common. The State's POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES FOR ALTERNATIVE LEARNING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS
manual 69 provides a comprehensive set of procedures used to place a student
in an AEP.
The first step in the process is labeling a student "at risk." Exactly what
the term means in its technical sense may vary from one school system to the
61. See Falk, supra note 42, at 469; Wren, supra note 3, at 349.
62. Wren, supra note 3, at 332.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 345.
67. Wren, supra note 3, at 344.
68. Reyes, supra note 3, at 543-44.
69. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
FOR ALTERNATIVE LEARNING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS GRADES K-12 (2003), http://www.
ncpublicschools.org/docs/schoolimprovement/altemative/learning/alpmanual.pdf [hereinafter
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES].
2005]
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next. North Carolina Public Schools describe an "at risk" student as "a
young person who, because of a wide range of individual, personal, financial,
familial, social, behavior or academic circumstances, may experience school
failure or other unwanted outcomes unless intervention occurs to reduce the
risk factors."7
Under North Carolina's transfer scheme, circumstances which place
students at risk include:
a. not meeting state/local/proficiency standards,
b. grade retention,
c. unidentified or inadequately addressed learning needs,
d. alienation from school,
e. unchallenging curricula and/or instruction,
f. tardiness and/or poor school attendance,
g. negative peer influence,
h. unmanageable behavior,
i. substance abuse and other health risk behaviors,
j. abuse and neglect,
k. inadequate parental, family, community and/or school support,
1. limited English proficiency or
m. other risk factors.7 1
According to the Policies and Procedures manual, a student transferred
as a result of poor academic performance and/or disruptive conduct is gener-
ally referred by parent, teacher, and/or school administrator to a student as-
sistance team or child study team.7 ' This team is comprised of at least one
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id.
[Vol. 29:3:635
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school or "area" administrator, curriculum specialist, teacher, school psy-
chologist, and hopefully, the parents.73
The student assistance team reviews evidentiary information supporting
transfer, documents the individuals involved in the decision, documents pa-
rental participation, or lack thereof, develops an action plan, reviews pro-
gress, and recommends whether or not to transfer a student.74 If a student is
transferred, this body is also typically responsible for facilitating successful
transition into and, hopefully, out of the alternative school."
North Carolina also requires the student assistance team to submit a re-
port to a "multi-disciplinary team," which makes a final placement deci-
sion. 76 The multi-disciplinary team is considered to be "necessary to keep
the decision-making process open, and it increases objectivity [and] fair-
ness."
77
When a student subject to transfer is also disabled (and therefore has an
individual education plan ["IEP"]), there are further procedures. Such pro-
cedures center on the continuity and execution of the IEP from one school to
the next, and remain focused on determining whether the transferee alterna-
tive school provides the same educational services for the student.78
IV. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
School administrators and attorneys should beware the many legal pit-
falls associated with the decision to transfer a student into an AEP. This part
views the legal landscape of AEP administration through the lenses of fed-
eral and state law in order to expose those pitfalls. In light of relevant case
law, the first section of this part considers the impact of an AEP transfer on
the rights of the traditional K-12 student under federal law and under state
law. The second section then turns to the impact of an AEP transfer on the
more particularized rights of the exceptional K- 12 student.
A. Rights to an Education Under the Federal Constitution
Federal courts have generally found that a student does not have a con-
stitutional right to particular incidents of education such as participation in
73. Id.
74. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 69, at 10-11.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 13.
2005]
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interscholastic activities, 79 enrollment in advanced placement classes,80 or
attending the school of their choice.8 ' However, as discussed in more detail
below, there may be legal claims cognizable under federal law that can arise
from one's placement into an AEP.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,82 the United
States Supreme Court held that there is no fundamental right to an education
under the United States Constitution.8 3 The Rodriguez holding was reaf-
firmed, although somewhat qualified, by Plyler v. Doe, 4 where the Court
again stated that education is not a fundamental right-but there could be no
rational basis for the complete denial of education unless that deprivation
"furthers some substantial goal of the State."8 5 Despite its refusal to treat
education as a fundamental right, in Goss v. Lopez,86 the United States Su-
preme Court determined that states are constrained to recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.87 It also held
that students have a reputation liberty interest in not being excluded from
school for good cause.8 In light of these constitutional constraints, the Court
determined that a suspension of ten days or less only requires notice, an ex-
planation of the evidence against the student, and an opportunity for him to
be heard. 9
Of course, in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court also held that where a state chooses to provide its citizens
with a public education, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that such education be provided equally to all citizens,
and that segregation on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause.9°
In several of the cases reviewed below, the respective plaintiffs have
challenged school officials' AEP transfer decisions as a violation of their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. As a point of clarification, it is important at this juncture to distin-
79. See Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1996).
81. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 668-70 (10th Cir. 1981).
82. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
83. See id. at 35.
84. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
85. See id. at 223-24.
86. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 582.
90. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
[Vol. 29:3:635
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guish between the substantive and procedural components of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause before delving into the case law.
The procedural due process challenges in all of the cases below con-
sider the overall fairness of the exclusionary procedures underlying an AEP
transfer, and whether those procedures were indeed implemented. In
Mathews v. Eldridge,91 the Supreme Court articulated factors to take into
consideration when determining how much process is due when the govern-
ment deprives someone of disability insurance.92 The procedures sought in
school-related due process claims are not significantly different.93 Courts
will consider: 1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;" 2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the] interest ... and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and
3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement[s] would entail. 94
As demonstrated by the case law below, under Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process analysis, courts generally find no violation if the
school officials gave the subject student notice and a right to be heard before
AEP transfer. The analytical framework applied to substantive due process
challenges is more involved and complex. Perhaps the best and most concise
explanation of this framework was offered by Justice Stevens in Daniels v.
Williams,95 a case resolved by the Court in 1986. In Daniels, Justice Stevens
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment "contains a substantive compo-
nent, sometimes referred to as 'substantive due process,' which bars certain
arbitrary government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them.'
96
Because there is no explicit or fundamental constitutional right to an
education under the United States Constitution, claims for deprivation of
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are subject
only to "rational basis" scrutiny.97 Under the rational basis standard of re-
view, a court need only determine if the school official's action was ration-
ally related to the promotion of a legitimate state interest.98 If so, there is no
91. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
92. Id. at 323, 334-35.
93. See Falk, supra note 42, at 461-62.
94. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
95. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
96. Id. at 337.
97. Craig v. Selma City Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 585, 594 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
98. Id. at 595.
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violation of a student's substantive due process rights.99 Generally speaking,
a violation only arises where the school's academic decision is "such a sub-
stantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judg-
ment." 100
The cases below-all of which involve the transfer of traditional stu-
dents into AEPs-have tested the contours of the Supreme Court's Four-
teenth Amendment analytical framework as applied to a student's rights to a
public education. In all of the cases, it is abundantly clear that rather than
appreciating the "opportunity" to attend an alternative program, the subject
plaintiffs viewed the transfer into an AEP as a harsh, exclusionary, and dis-
ciplinary measure analogous to an expulsion.'0 '
In Zamora v. Pomeroy, the mother of a high school student brought ac-
tion against a school board superintendent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that her son's civil rights were violated when he was transferred to an alter-
native school after contraband was found in his locker.0 2 Notably, the super-
intendent in that case characterized the alternative school as one which en-
rolled potential drop-outs and offered easier courses than were offered to the
average student in the traditional school. 10 3 Plaintiff claimed that he was not
given fair notice and an opportunity to be heard before being transferred to a
school that lacked the academic standing of his original school."
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
school superintendent and plaintiff appealed. 0 5 The Tenth Circuit affirmed,
explaining that absent a showing that the alternative school assignment was
not "substantially prejudicial," plaintiff lacked standing. 0 6 The court came
to this conclusion only after explicitly acknowledging that the student was
readmitted to and graduated from his old high school.'07 As to the procedural
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
101. Wren, supra note 3, at 354.
102. 639 F.2d 662, 663 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 665.
104. See id. at 664.
105. Id. at 667.
106. Id. at 670. Specifically, the court stated:
[i]nasmuch as the sanctions imposed were far less severe than expulsion, and in view of the
fact that his offense was serious, it cannot be said that they evidence an injury within the
framework of the constitution, one which is capable of supporting jurisdiction of this court.
The Zamoras' allegations that the ESC was so inferior to amount to an expulsion from the edu-
cational system are not bome out by the record, and in the absence of a clear showing that the
ESC assignment was substantially prejudicial, the Zamoras lack the requisite standing to attack
the appellees' actions on that ground.
Zamora, 639 F.2d at 670.
107. Id. at 669.
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due process issue, it also acknowledged that he was given five occasions to
explain and defend himself prior to the transfer.'08
Interestingly, without inquiring into the nature of the alternative school
or the services rendered there, the court expressly concluded that the "sanc-
tion" of transfer was less severe than an expulsion, which, by implication,
would be more deserving of heightened procedural safeguards.0 9
Similarly, in Buchanan v. City of Bolivar,"0 a junior high school stu-
dent's mother brought suit against her son's school principal under § 1983,
claiming that the principal's decision to transfer her son to an alternative
school as a form of discipline deprived him of his rights to procedural due
process and equal protection."' She further alleged that the principal and
two police officers discriminated against her son on the basis of his race." 2
In that case, a junior high school student threw a rock that caused dam-
age to an assistant principal's car." 3 The assistant principal witnessed the
destructive behavior first-hand and contacted police, who took the student
into their custody." 4 The police released custody of the student to his mother
four hours later, and the student was not prosecuted."5 However, the assis-
tant principal determined that discipline was appropriate and allowed the
mother and her son "to choose between serving a ten day at-home suspension
or attending an alternative school for ten days. Plaintiff opted [for the] alter-
native school and signed an agreement indicating her consent to her son's
attendance at alternative school.""' 6
Although the district court granted summary judgment in favor of de-
fendant, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. 117 The court ac-
knowledged that students facing suspension from school possess property
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 Ap-
plying the Goss rule to the facts, the Sixth Circuit found no evidence in the
record as to what type of conversations took place between plaintiff, her son,
and the school officials." 9 Furthermore, the court found neither evidence
that the school officials informed plaintiff of the reasons behind their deci-
108. Id. at 668.
109. Id. at 670.
110. 99 F.3d 1352 (6th Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 1355, 1358-60.
112. Id. at 1355, 1360.
113. Id. at 1354.
114. Id. at 1354-55.
115. Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1355.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1360.
118. Id. at 1359.
119. Id.
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sion to transfer the student nor evidence showing that they gave him an op-
portunity to present his side of the story. 2  The Sixth Circuit remanded for
the district court to develop the record. 1
21
As to plaintiffs equal protection and race discrimination claims, the
circuit court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of defendants. 22 The
court explained that while the assistant principal filed an affidavit stating that
he treated plaintiffs son no differently than any other student, plaintiff did
not carry her burden of providing evidence to the contrary to survive sum-
mary judgment. 123 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiffs race
discrimination claims for the same reasons. 1
24
In Nevares v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District,
125
the father of a fifteen-year-old high school student brought an action against
the school district challenging his son's transfer to an alternative education
program based on the fact that the student was detained by police for conduct
punishable as a felony (again, throwing rocks at a car). 126 Weeks after the
incident, the school received a police report of the detention and the assistant
principal pulled the subject student from class. 127 The student was reassigned
to an alternative school for "students whose violations . . . fall short of trig-
gering suspension or expulsion, but for reasons of safety and order must be
removed from the regular classroom."'2 8
The district court held that the statute that permitted such a transfer
without prior hearing was unconstitutional, and the school district ap-
pealed. 29 The Fifth Circuit held that the student lacked standing to challenge
the statute or seek injunctive relief absent deprivation of a federally protected
property or liberty interest. 30 Specifically, like the Tenth Circuit in Zamora,
the Fifth Circuit found no due process violation because "no protected prop-
erty interest [was] implicated in a school's denial to offer a student a particu-
lar curriculum."131
120. Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1359.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1360.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 111 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1997).
126. See id. at 26.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Nevares, 111 F.3dat 26.
131. Id. at 27.
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In C.B. v. Driscoll,32 two students brought § 1983 actions against the
school board after it took exclusionary disciplinary measures against them.
3
One student, C.B., was suspended for "nine days for the possession of a
'look-alike' illegal substance." '134 After the suspension, the principal trans-
ferred C.B. to an "'alternative school' where C.B. would do work assigned
by [his] regular teachers .... C.B. then withdrew from school and filed [the]
lawsuit. Later, tests revealed the substance not to be marijuana."' 35
C.B. claimed "that his procedural due process rights were violated be-
cause he was suspended without adequate notice or hearing." '136 Affirming
the district court's ruling in favor of defendants on their motion for summary
judgment,137 the Eleventh Circuit stated "once school administrators tell a
student what they heard or saw, ask why they heard or saw it, and allow a
brief response, a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth
Amendment demands."' 38 Finding that C.B. had two opportunities to discuss
his acts, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. 39 The district court
also granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on C.B.'s claim that
his substantive due process rights were violated by the decision to send him
to an alternative school. 140 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding once again. 4' The circuit court stated that executive acts such as the
decision to send C.B. to an alternative school "warrant no substantive due
process protection unless the right infringed is recognized by the Constitu-
tion as 'fundamental,' which is to say that 'our democratic society and its
inherent freedoms would be lost if that right were to be violated.' '1 42 The
court explained that "[b]ecause the right to an education is state-created, that
right can be restricted as long as adequate procedures are followed."'' 4 3 Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the substantive due process claim.'"
Interestingly, in a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit also expressed doubt
that C.B. had a property interest under Georgia law in attending his tradi-
tional high school instead of attending the alternative school to which he was
132. 82 F.3d 383 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
133. See id. at 385.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 385.
136. Id. at 388.
137. C.B., 82 F.3d at 385.
138. Id. at 386.
139. Id. at 388-89.
140. Id. at 389.
141. Id.
142. C.B., 82 F.3d at 389.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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assigned.'45 In support of this notion, the court cited Doe v. Bagan,4 6 where
the Tenth Circuit suggested that the right to a public education does not en-
compass "a right to choose one's particular school."' 47
In Bagan, a mother brought suit under § 1983 on behalf of her nine-
year-old son against two caseworkers for the Colorado Department of Social
Services and other individuals for actions arising out of an investigation of
John Doe, the son, on suspicion of possible child abuse. 48 After learning of
a possible incident of sexual assault on a five-year-old girl, Bagan, one of the
caseworkers, contacted Doe's school to arrange an interview. 49 He spoke to
Doe alone in the principal's office for approximately ten minutes, and Doe
denied the abuse.' 50 Bagan later discussed the matter with Doe's mother. 5'
Ultimately, for reasons unstated in the opinion, Doe's name was placed on a
state registry as a child abuser. 52 Plaintiffs alleged that Doe subsequently
endured humiliation at the hands of his classmates when they learned of the
suspicion against him.'53 Although Doe's mother attempted to transfer him
to another school, her request was refused because Doe's special education
needs purportedly could not be fully met by the transferee school.
5 4
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated Doe's due process rights by
destroying his reputation that ultimately led to his denial of his state-
guaranteed right to an education.'55 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.' 56
Although the court acknowledged that school age children in Colorado
must be given the opportunity to receive a free public education, the court
found it obvious that Doe was not deprived of this right.'57 Rather, the court
determined that Doe "was only denied his request to attend the public school
of his choice. Plaintiffs cite no Colorado authority, and we have found none,
indicating that the right to a public education encompasses a right to choose
one's particular school."' 58
145. Id. at 389 n.5.
146. 41 F.3d 571 (10th Cir. 1994).
147. C.B., 82 F.3d at 389 (quoting Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 576 (10th Cir. 1994)).
148. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 573.
149. Id. at 574.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 575-76.
154. Id. at 576 n.5.
155. Id. at 575-76.
156. Id. at 577.
157. Id. at 576.
158. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 576.
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Taken together, Driscoll and Bagan suggest that substantive due proc-
ess claims can only succeed where the transferee alternative school is found
to be so bereft of educational opportunity that enrollment in such a program
is paramount to no education at all. One should note, however, that the stu-
dent in Bagan did not claim that his state constitutional rights were violated.
As explained in some detail below, education opportunity is a fundamental
right under certain state constitutions. Therefore, it may be possible to suc-
cessfully state a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a state-
guaranteed right to a public education by transfer into an AEP where the
plaintiff proves that the AEP is paramount to no education at all.
B. Student Rights to an Education Under Various State Constitutions
"Every state constitution has an education clause. The highest courts of
many states have held that their state constitutions' education clauses afford
individuals an enforceable right to education."'' 59 In California and Pennsyl-
vania, education is considered a fundamental right under the state constitu-
tion.16° Florida's constitution provides that "education of children is a fun-
damental value" of the state.16
1
The Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that "[a] child's right to an ade-
quate education is a fundamental one under our Constitution."'' 62 Pennsyl-
vania's highest court declared the same in School District of Wilkinsburg v.
Wilkinsburg Education Ass 'n.163 In Horton v. Meskill,"6 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut stated that "the right to education is so basic and fundamental
that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.' ' 65 The Su-
preme Courts of North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Virginia have also found that
education is a fundamental right under their states' constitutions.
66
It follows that a student's state equal protection 67 and due process
claims arising out of their transfer into an AEP would more likely succeed
where their state recognizes a fundamental or enforceable right to educa-
tion. 68
159. Reed, supra note 15, at 582.
160. Id. at 583.
161. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
162. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
163. 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995).
164. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
165. Id. at 373.
166. Reed, supra note 15, at 598-600.
167. Id. at 596-97. Several state courts have determined that education is a fundamental
right for the purposes of an equal protection analysis under their states' constitutions. Id.
168. Id.at591.
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Where a student challenges a state action that discriminates against him
on the basis of his race, courts will review the state action on a strict scrutiny
basis. 169 Under strict scrutiny review, a court will determine whether the
state action is narrowly tailored to the promotion of a compelling govern-
ment interest. 70 Courts will also apply this standard of review where the
basis of a student's challenge is the complete deprivation of a fundamental
right. 171
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision in Kukor v. Grover, is il-
lustrative as to a state court's treatment of the issue of educational depriva-
tion where education is a fundamental right under the state's constitution. I7
In Kukor, a group of taxpayers and residents sued Wisconsin's Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction and Wisconsin's Department of Revenue, attack-
ing the constitutionality of a state formula of school funding. 73 The plain-
tiffs argued that because the funding formula did not address the greater fi-
nancial needs of poor school districts (such as offering more dropout preven-
tion units), the formula violated the educational uniformity requirement un-
der the state constitution and the equal protection rights of underprivileged
students under Wisconsin's state constitution. 174
Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that the districts with
a high concentration of poverty faced an "overburden" in the area of dropout
prevention programs for high-risk youth, 75 it held that the funding formula
did not unconstitutionally impinge on the state constitution's uniformity re-
quirement. 176
The court also ruled unfavorably to plaintiffs' equal protection
claims. 177 Importantly, the court interpreted plaintiffs' claims as challenging
the funding formula and not as challenging state action depriving students of
educational opportunity. 78 Acknowledging that an "equal opportunity for
education" is a fundamental right under Wisconsin's constitution, the court
found that such a right was not implicated by the challenged spending dispar-
169. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
170. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 582 n. 13 (Wis. 1989).
171. Id. at 579.
172. See id. at 568-94.
173. Id. at 570.
174. Id. at 573.
175. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 573.
176. Id. at 578.
177. Id. at 579.
178. Id.
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ity. 179 With this characterization of plaintiffs' claim, the court applied a ra-
tional basis review and found the funding formula constitutional.' 80
Kukor suggests that a student challenging a transfer into an AEP may
only successfully state an equal protection claim where the right to education
is a fundamental right under the state constitution and where the student al-
leges a complete deprivation of that right by way of a transfer to the alterna-
tive program.'8 ' Obviously, this is an onerous burden.
C. The Particularized Rights of Exceptional Students Under Federal Law
Students sent to AEPs are often learning disabled. 82 In Texas, for ex-
ample, twenty percent of all students served statewide in 1996-1997 were
characterized as special education or special needs students under federal
law.'83 Accordingly, school administrators should take note of the legal is-
sues particularly pertaining to the transfer of an exceptional student into an
AEP. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides, inter alia, that:
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. 1
8 4
Further, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")185
provides, inter alia, that a state qualifying for federal assistance under the
Act must establish:
[p]rocedures to ensure that testing and evaluation materials and
procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and placement
of children with disabilities will be selected and administered so as
not to be racially or culturally discriminatory .... [N]o single pro-
cedure shall be the sole criterion for determining an appropriate
educational program for a child.186
179. Id.
180. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 579.
181. Seeid. at 579-80.
182. Wren, supra note 3, at 352.
183. Bickerstaff, supra note 39, at 38.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
185. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (2000).
186. § 1412(a)(6)(B).
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As a condition for federal financial assistance, IDEA requires states to
ensure a "free appropriate public education" for all disabled students.'87 The
Act establishes a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards for ensur-
ing this right, including the so-called "stay-put" provision, which directs that
a disabled child "shall remain in [his or her] then-current educational place-
ment" pending completion of any review proceedings unless the parents and
state or local educational agencies agree otherwise. 188 This is one of the most
frequently contested safety measures under IDEA.
89
Originally, IDEA was a response by Congress to the growing need to
educate disabled students who were essentially abandoned by public
schools. 9 ' In the congressional studies behind the formulation of the Act,
Congress found that one out of every eight disabled students was excluded
from the public school system altogether.' 9' Congress also found that "many
others were simply 'warehoused' in special classes or were neglectfully
shepherded through the system until they were old enough to drop out."' 192
What is more disturbing is congressional statistics revealed that in 1974, the
states failed to meet the educational needs of eighty-two percent of all chil-
dren with emotional disabilities.' 93
IDEA "confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right
to public education in participating [s]tates."' 94 It also assures that, to the
maximum extent possible, states will "mainstream" disabled students, "i.e.
... educate them with children who are not disabled."' 95 Further, the Act
assures that disabled students will be segregated or otherwise removed from
the regular classroom setting "only when the nature or severity of the handi-
cap is such that education in regular classes ... cannot be achieved satisfac-
torily."' 96 Of course, IDEA also requires that an individualized education
program ("IEP") be constructed, reviewed, and, if necessary, revised at least
once a year to ensure that the needs of the disabled student are being met. 197
187. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
188. § 14150).
189. Elizabeth A. Bunch, School Discipline Under the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act: How the Stay-Put Provision Limits Schools in Providing a Safe Learning Envi-
ronment, 27 J. L. & EDUC. 315, 316 (1998).
190. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988).
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).
193. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975)).
194. Id. at 310.
195. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.
196. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5), current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2000)).
197. Id.
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IDEA provides procedural safeguards related to placement.198 First, it
grants parents the right to review "all relevant records pertaining to the iden-
tification, evaluation, and educational placement of their child."1 99 Second, it
provides them with prior written notice with respect to changes in place-
ment. oo Third, it gives them an opportunity to present complaints.20' Fi-
nally, it provides them "an opportunity for 'an impartial due process hearing'
with respect to any such complaints. 20 2 At the conclusion of any such hear-
ing, parents and the educational agency may seek administrative review and
then file a civil action.20 3
The landmark case dealing with exclusion of an exceptional student in
light of IDEA was Honig v. Doe.2° In that case, the parents of two emotion-
ally handicapped students challenged the school board's unilateral exclusion
of their children from the traditional classroom for purportedly dangerous
and disruptive conduct stemming from their disabilities. 205 In both instances,
the school, pursuant to the California Education Code, placed the students at
issue on indefinite suspension pending the completion of expulsion proceed-
ings.20 6 The Honig Court found that the code violated the stay-put provision
of the EHA.2°7
Recognizing the school officials' limited rights to suspend students for a
period of ten days or less, the Court intimated that schools are not without
recourse in keeping students out of the school at the conclusion of that pe-
riod.208 Rather, it found nothing in the Act, preventing schools from seeking
to enjoin a dangerous child from attending the school.20 9 In such a case, a
school would have the burden of showing that administrative review would
be futile.20 They would also have to overcome the presumption in favor of
the child's current placement by showing that maintaining the child in such a
placement "is substantially likely to result in injury either to himself or her-
self, or to others. 21'
198. Id.
199. Id. at 312.
200. Honig, 484 U.S. at 312.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
205. Id. at 312-14.
206. Id. at 313 & n.2, 315.
207. See id. at 328 & n.10.
208. Id. at 327-28.
209. Honig, 484 U.S. at 327.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 328.
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Some argue that, as a result of Honig, schools lack the flexibility needed
to adequately deal with disruptive students who happen to be learning dis-
abled.21 2 Indeed, some contend that they lack flexibility with traditional stu-
dents who might allege a disability after being subjected to an exclusionary
213disciplinary measure.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dis-
trict of Los Angeles v. Honig,214 held that the protection afforded by IDEA is
not limited to those children who had been diagnosed with a disability prior
to their misconduct.215 Thus, the holding explicitly allows students to claim
to have a disability under IDEA at any time before or after disciplinary ac-
tion is taken, and thus misuses the stay-put provision to avoid punishment.216
At least one scholar suggests that expelling a child immediately pending the
due process hearing is one way to avoid this "loophole., 217
Randy M v. Texas City lSD218 is also illustrative. There, the mother of a
special education student filed an application for an injunction to prevent the
school district from placing the student into an AEP.2 19 In that case, "Randy,
acting in concert with another male student, ripped the break-away wind
pants off a female student., 22' Because he was disabled, the placement was
abated until an admission review and dismissal committee determined
whether Randy's actions manifested from his disability.22' The committee
concluded that they did not, and decided to transfer Randy to the AEP for the
remainder of the school year.222 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held in favor of the school district and declined to
223enter an injunction.
Interestingly, as to plaintiffs contention that Randy's misbehavior
might have been due to an unidentified disability, the court determined that
the committee "bent over backwards" to give her an opportunity to gather
and present evidence of an unrecognized disability which may have caused
him to rip off the student's pants. 24 Thus, the case provides a good example
212. Bunch, supra note 189, at 318.
213. Id.
214. 976 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992).
215. Id. at 494.
216. Bunch, supra note 189, at 318.
217. Id. at 320.
218. 93 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
219. Id. at 1310.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Randy M, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
224. Id.
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of how districts may protect themselves from the "loophole" in IDEA by
providing a potential litigant every reasonable opportunity to prove that the
student's misconduct was attributable to an unidentified disability before
sending the child into an AEP.z25
In light of the relevant case law, critics of IDEA argue that it must be
changed to allow schools to remove dangerous and consistently disruptive
students from the regular classroom in order to ensure a safe and productive
learning environment for all students.226
V. REDUCING LEGAL EXPOSURE AND ADHERING TO THE BROWN MORAL
IMPERATIVE
School officials and legal practitioners should seriously evaluate the le-
gal exposure that can arise from a student's transfer into an AEP. Based on
the case law discussed in this article, it appears that students subject to trans-
fer into an AEP may have the ability to set forth claims that are cognizable
under both federal and state law if the conditions are right.
Although the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
education is not a fundamental right, in light of such cases as Goss, Plyler,
and Ewing, there may be reason to apply a heightened standard of scrutiny in
the face of a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge for transfer into
an AEP where a student can show on the record that his transfer into such a
program resulted in the outright deprivation of his educational opportunity.
The Eleventh Circuit hinted at this sentiment in C.B. when it noted in the
face of a substantive due process claim that the state may only restrict educa-
tional opportunity.227
If, indeed, the AEP is shown to be absolutely bereft of any educational
opportunity, it is likely that a federal court would at least find standing for a
substantive due process claim, since an outright deprivation of education
would undoubtedly constitute "a substantial departure from accepted aca-
demic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment., 228
Conversely, it is highly doubtful that a student can successfully chal-
lenge an AEP transfer as a violation of his or her procedural due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment even where there are only slight
procedural protections. As the Eleventh Circuit succinctly stated in C.B.,
"once school administrators tell a student what they heard or saw, ask why
225. See Bunch, supra note 189, at 318.
226. See id. at 320.
227. See C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 389 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
228. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
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they heard or saw it, and allow a brief response, a student has received all the
process that the Fourteenth Amendment demands., 229 Even the most rudi-
mentary procedures underlying a school official's decision to transfer the
student into an AEP would likely pass constitutional muster under a Four-
teenth Amendment procedural due process attack.
Finally, as to cases arising under state law, school officials and legal
practitioners should be particularly aware of their exposure where the state
constitution recognizes education as a fundamental right. In such states, liti-
gants opposing transfer into an AEP will likely achieve strict scrutiny review
if they show that the AEP is completely devoid of academic opportunities. If
the litigant in such a case is able to show on the record that the AEP at hand
is indeed the "dumping ground" described by so many of the critics of AEPs,
a school official's decision to transfer a student into such a program may be
deemed unconstitutional as the transfer would effect the complete depriva-
tion of the student's fundamental right to an education.
Beyond these most basic requirements of the law, however, school offi-
cials should also evaluate their compliance with the moral imperative articu-
lated by the Brown Court more than fifty years ago when considering
whether to implement a program like an AEP.2 30 In Brown, Chief Justice
Warren stated:
[education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education.23'
In light of this statement, and in view of the opinion as a whole, it is
abundantly clear the Brown Court understood that schools do more than just
teach academic skills; they also develop the social skills necessary to achieve
in an adult society. As one scholar recently noted:
[s]ociety itself has deep and legitimate interests in social re-
production-the intellectual, moral, and social development of the
present youth who must become society's leaders in all fields of
endeavor .... The collective future of our schools (a majority of
whose students are expected to be nonwhite by 2020) and our so-
ciety (a majority of whose members are expected to be nonwhite
229. C.B., 82 F.3d at 386.
230. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
231. Id.
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by the middle of the 21st century), depends upon educating citi-
zens who will be able to live and work comfortably across racial
lines.
232
In the face of these realities, there is ample evidence which suggests
that our schools systematically deprive the nation's unruly minority students
the very kind of opportunities discussed by the Brown Court by cordoning
them off from the rest of their traditional school counterparts with their
placement into AEPs. Even if the AEPs offer the same academic opportuni-
ties offered by the transferor schools, the only environment to which such
students may "adjust normally" is one of isolation rather than integration.
Since the United States Department of Education first released the in-
famous "Coleman Report" in 1966, scholars have long recognized that a
student's "achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds
and aspirations of the other students in the school" and classroom.
2 33
The report concluded, in fact, that the social characteristics of a
school's student body were the single most important school-
related factor in predicting minority student achievement: "Attrib-
utes of other students account for far more variation in the
achievement of minority group children than do any attributes of
school facilities and slightly more than do attributes of staff.
2 34
It follows that the systematic exclusion and isolation of unruly minority
students through placement into AEPs ultimately frustrates Brown's most
basic promise.2 35 Although school officials may contend that the AEPs offer
staff, curricula, and facilities exactly like that of the transferor school (an
argument that still arises long after the "separate but equal doctrine" was
purportedly obliterated by Brown), while easing the work of traditional
school teachers and enhancing the education of those who "want to learn,"
these officials cannot credibly assert that such programs meet the moral im-
perative articulated by the Brown Court.
School officials and legal practitioners should recognize that AEPs will
not, and indeed cannot, meet the dictates of Brown so long as they function
on a philosophical framework contrary to the original mission of traditional
schools. An AEP should not be created to function as a "soft jail" that keeps
232. John Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm"? Racial Resegregation, High
Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1375, 1410-11 (2003).
233. Id. at 1415.
234. Id.
235. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 556.
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disruptive or "bad" students away from the mainstream crowd. Rather, if
AEPs are to function at all, they must do so with an eye toward academic and
social equity, not only within the sphere of alternative schools, but also in the
greater sphere of public schools in general.236
To relieve the very need for AEPs school administrators should docu-
ment and track disciplinary referral trends among teachers working at their
schools in order to identify causes precipitating exclusion. Once such causes
are identified, administrators can attack the heart of the problem through any
number of interventions.
As discussed earlier, there is evidence that the disparate representation
of African Americans and Latinos in AEPs is, in part, attributable to poor
class management skills and cultural ignorance exhibited by novice teachers.
Indeed, it appears that culturally ignorant assumptions may work the greatest
harm upon poor and minority student populations. In one study, for exam-
ple, "teachers in middle-class, predominantly white schools viewed student
inattention as an indication that the teacher needed to do more to gain the
student's interest." '237 Conversely, teachers in lower class, predominantly
black schools attributed student inattention to the students' inability to con-
centrate. 238 These findings exemplify the harm arising from false assump-
tions and illustrate the notion that fiction that is perceived as real is real in its
consequences.
In any event, in light of the current state of affairs, the need for mean-
ingful and effective teacher training to improve classroom management and
to enhance cultural awareness is obvious. Such training will undoubtedly go
a long way toward reversing the trend of excluding poor minority students
from the rest of the student population based on their misconduct and will
help to facilitate the type integration envisioned by the Brown Court.
It is this vision that should drive the efforts of school officials to create
and sustain genuine academic and social equity in the nation's schools. It is
this vision that should guide the legal analysis of controversies stemming
from the development and implementation of AEPs across the country. It is
this vision that cannot be forgotten.
236. See Wren, supra note 3, at 353.
237. Reed, supra note 15, at 608.
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